The Chao Phraya delta : historical development, dynamics and challenges of Thailand's rice bowl by Molle, François et al.
François Molle et al. Dry season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin ...
Dry-season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin: what is at stake
and how to gain in efficiency and equity1
François Molle2, Chatchom Chompadit3, Jesda KeawkLllaya4
Abstract: The Chao Phraya basin has long been a water-deficit basin. Water stored in
the Bhumipol and Sitikit dams only allow the irrigation of half of the delta, in average.
The share of water available for agriculture in the delta is declining because of higher
water abstraction both within the upper reaches of the basin and in Bangkok
Metropolitan Area. The question of where, to whom, when and how this scarce
resource is allocated is therefore ofparamount importance.
The paper first reviews the sectoral and spatial pattern of allocation in the last 25 years
and assesses the efficiency and the equity of this allocation. It subsequent/y
investigates ail the options offered to increase management efficiency and proposes
some guideline for achieving higher equity and more even sustainability of farming
systems. This includes technical, socio-institutional and economic issues.
1 Inttoduction
The Chao Phraya basin makes up one third of Thailand's territory, encompasses the great
majority of irrigated areas and a/so includes Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The basin can be
conveniently divided in three sections (Figure 1). The upper basin (the catchment area of
Bhumipol and Sirikit dams), the middle basin (downstream of the dams, down to Nakhon
Sawan), and the lower part (or the delta). The yearly inflow into the dams has been declining
because of deforestation, decreasing precipitation (Bancha, this conference) and growing
water abstraction in the upper basin, from 11 to 9 billion m3 during the last thirty years (Molle
et al. 2000). In the middle reach, both medium and large scale RIO projects and group
irrigation based on pumping along the river (fostered by the Oepartment of Energy
Promotion). In the delta, 1 million ha can potentially be irrigated (with a high potential for
triple cropping), while BMA's demand has risen from .36 million m3/day in 1979 to
1 This papers presents a few points drawn from the report: Molle, François; Chompadist, Chatchom; 5rijantr, T.
and Jesda Keawkulaya. 2000. Dry-season water allocation and management in the Chao Phraya basin. Research
Report submitted to the EU, draft. Bangkok, 235 p.
2 Researcher at IRD <'nstitut de Recherche pour le Développement), working at Kasetsart University:
odoras@ku.ac.th
3 Royal Irrigation Department, Bangkok
4 Kasetsart University, Department of Irrigation Engineering
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approximately 7.5 million m3/day in 2000 (which includes an approximate 3 Mm3/day from
underground water). A twenty one fold increase in twenty two years...
Ouring the dry season, ail water users within the middle and lower reaches of the basin rely,
by and large, on water delivered by the Bhumipol and Sirikit dams. Oeclining inflows and
growing non-agricultural use makes a despairingly simple equation: water resources for
agriculture are deemed to decrease substantially, with a drastic impact on the sustainability
of farming in the irrigated areas of the basin. A wide range of solutions have been proposed,
debated or opposed by the different stakeholders concerned by the issue. These include:
Increase of supply: This is the preferred option of government agencies which have been
engaged in water resources development in the past (RIO, EGAT, .. ). The main solutions are
the building of additional dams, the transbasin diversion of water from the Salaween and
Mekong rivers, the tapping of more aquifers.
Improvement of overall management: Improved knowledge of hydrologic conditions, better
co-ordination, better timing and assessment of water releases, reduction of water released
by the dams and f10wing to the sea in excess of the discharge needed to control seawater
intrusion, etc. Institutional and administrative reforms are also needed to create a Basin
Agency which should be responsible for the allocation and monitoring of water supply, for the
control of the development of water use, and for enforcing legislation.
Water saving and upgrading efficiency of use: Ali users may potentially use water in smaller
quantities and with fewer losses. Irrigators should adopt water saving farm practices and
crops with lower water requirements. They should associate in order to adopt patterns of
water distribution believed to reduce waste and increase equity. Loss by infiltration in canals
could be cut by lining them. Urban tap water networks should be improved to reduce
leakage. Industries should adopt water saving innovations and recycling of the water which
quality has deteriorated to the point that it cannot be used anymore (a sink in the system).
Economic incentives: ln parallel, or as a complement, policies aimed at introducing economic
incentives should contribute to water saving ("user-pay principle"), water qu~lity protection
("polluter-pay principle") and to an economically more efficient allocation of water among
users (water rights, water markets). Far-reaching administrative and legal reforms are pre-
requisite to these options.
Ali these options have pros and cons, contenders and opponents. The present paper is not
intended to address ail these options. A first part examines projections of water use and
stresses the impact on agriculture in the dry-season. Past records of water allocation in the
last 25 years are then assessed and patterns of spatial inequity are emphasised. Attention
will then be turned to the allocation and distribution processes, and several improvements
are proposed in order to increase efficiency and equity.
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FIGURE 1: LAYOUT OF THE CHAO PHRAYA BASIN AND ITS THREE SUB-DIVISIONS
We must first establish a prospective view on how the pattern of water use is likely to evolve
in the near future. Ali the projections presented below are based on orders of magnitude and
average (or median) values; they represent likely trends, and disregard yearly fluctuations.
On the supply side, there is Iittle data on how the inflow into the two dams is going to evolve
but bath the absolute increase of water abstraction in the upper part of the basin and the
dedining rainfall climatic trend do not allow the slightest hope that supply will increase. In the
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northern region, the irrigated area is reported to have increased 47% between 1980 and
1989 (ESCAP, 1981). It is estimated that the two dams yearly net inllow (evaporation
discounted) has decreased from 11 to 9 Bm3 in the last 28 years and that it will drop another
1 Bm3 in the next 15 years (Molle et al. 2000).
Water diverted from the Mae Klong basin is already reaching Thon Buri in limited amounts
(.4 Bm3/year) but the discharge is phased to reach 23 cms in 2010 and a maximum of 45
cms in 2017, in accordance with the graduai development of water treatment units.
There is no reliable data on the exact volume extracted from the aquifer in BMA. Estimates
from JICA, ten years ago, amounted to 2.9 Mm3/day and TDRI (1990) concluded that they
are probably around 3 million m3/day (=3 Mm3/day). Bangkok and the surrounding provinces
are now believed to use 1.5 million cubic metres out of 2.5 of water pumped from
underground aquifers each year (Bangkok Post, 1999). Given (a) that the price differential
between piped water and groundwater has not been bridged in the last ten years; (b) that the
industrial sector has dramatically expanded, and (c) the admitted unrecorded pumping, there
is little likelihood that these amounts may have decreased during this period. Therefore, our
calculations are made considering an actual pumping rate of 3 Mm3/day. It is also estimated
that the capacity of Bangkok aquifers to supply ground water is about 1 Mm3/day, but that
extraction should be less than this capacity in order to prevent land subsidence (Bangkok
Post, 1999).
Figure 2 shows that the estimated amount and variation of the different sources of water.
OveraIl , the average total controlled water ,supply in the basin (from dams, underground
water and diversion from the Mae Klong) is' going to decrease under 10 Bm3 (with a slight
temporary rebound in 2015 due to the full capacity of the diversion from Mae Klong but
further decline in the long term).
FIGURE 2: TRENDS IN TOTAL AVERAGE SUPPLY TO THE CHAO PHRAYA BASIN (MIDDLE AND LOWER REACH)
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2.2 Detnand ~ide
Dry season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin ...
On the demand side, it is assumed that water uses and dams releases in the wet season will
not vary significantly. Agriculture will continue to be supplemented with irrigation at similar
rates and the impact of the growth of other uses will be marginal because of their magnitude
and of the contribution of uncontrolled side-flows. The focus is therefore on the water
remaining for dry-season cropping, while the production potential of the irrigated agricultural
sector will remain largely above the share of water which is Iikely to be apportioned to il.
A growing and Iittle elastic demand is governed by the growth of cities and industries.
TORl's projections in (TORI, 1990) were based on a water demand in BMA projected to grow
at 9% per year for residential and 10% for services but the crisis has probably levelled of
these numbers. We will consider here different hypotheses of growth from a current value of
7.5 Mm3/day, including 3 M from aquifers. The obvious unsustainable nature of groundwater
overdraft means that, sooner or later, the water supplied by the aquifer will have to be drawn
from superficial water (Sethaputra et al. 1990). If we consider that at least half of the
estimated 3 Mm3/day underground water contribution will have to be transferred to
superficial supplies, this means that another 0.55 Bm3 must be supplied yearly by the river
system (Chao Phraya and Mae Klong). In other words, Bangkok area is on the way to move
from a negligible or secondary user to a main one. Even though, fortunately, a large part of
Bangkok needs will be supplied by sideflows, the burden on the reservoirs is still estimated at
around half of the total need in superficial wate.-s.
2.g Barancing detnand and ~uppry
Assuming that the wet season commands an average dams release of 5 Bm3 (as seen from
historical series) and that this value will change little in the mid-term (see earlier comment),
we may now use the projections on overall supply to deduce both the amount of water
available in the dry-season and the share remaining for agriculture after other priority uses
are satisfied.
The trend in water requirements for BMA is here estimated for a growth ratio of 5%/year.
This demand will be partly met by underground water, Mae Klong diversion and by the Chao
Phraya river. Salinity control (water lost to the sea), is attributed a floor value of .5 Bm3 for
the dry season. The increase of supply from the Mae Klong and the decrease by half of
underground water (passed over to superficial water') are also taken into accounl. The
average eontrolled water (dams) whieh will be avai/ab/e for inigation and other uses in the
delta and middle basin in the dry season will undergo a eut of 15% (from 5.1 to 4.4 8m3) in
the next 15 years. For yearly growth rates of 3% and 7%, these cuts will be 4 and 30 Bm3
respectively. The decrease will be extremely sensitive to the growth of non-agricultural use
5 During the month of January, abundant water is coming from the drainage of the f1oodplain. Dams are
contributing mostly in the February-June period, and in some periods of the wet season in some years.
6 This also means, in passing, that BMA will have to upgrade its capacity to distribute superficial water.
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which is now more problematic to assess than before the crisis: using the rates adopted by
TDRI in the 1990 study, the cut would be 54%... It is worth noting again that the situation is
significantly smoothened by the rising inflow from the Mae Klong basin scheduled over the
next decade, without which the drop would be far more critical.
The general picture in the 15 years ahead is therefore one of a significant reduction of the
water available for the agricultural sector, which will turn drastic if demand growth returns to
pre-crisis levels.
FIGURE 3: EVOLUTION OF THE AVERAGE TOTAL CONTROLLED WATER SUPPLY IN THE BASIN
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A first surge of double cropping (72,000 rai) was observed in the year 1971 in the upper
delta; this was concomitant to the advent of High Yield Varieties (HYVs). A second hike
occurred in 1973, further to the beginning of the operation of the Sirikit dam and the
threshold of 2 million rai was reached in 1976 ; only three years later, the rice area amounted
to 3 million rai (a little less than 500,000 ha), a value which can be taken as an average for
the 20 ensuing years. During this period, the upper delta accounted for an average of 45% of
the DS rice area, against 55% for the lower delta. Figure 4 also presents the rice area
corresponding to the Mae Klong area. From this figure pops up the evidence of a notable
difference between the upper and lower parts of the delta: while the later, with an average
value of 1.8 millions rai, remains rather stable (although showing a graduai decline due to the
encroachment of urban areas), the share of the upper delta is rather hectic. The ail times
record occurred in 19ê8, after three consecutive years in which the share of the upper delta
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exceeded that of the lower delta to reach 2 millions rai. This came along with a surge of triple
cropping, amounting to roughly 1 million rai in 1998 and 1999.
To put it short, the lower delta is advantaged in years of shortage, as water is delivered to
this area in priority, in order to ensure environmental sustainability, transportation and to
control sartne intrusions. With water filling up the extensive and dense network. of channels of
this fiat area, there is litt/e scope for farmers to refrain from pumping and for officers to
prevent them to do so. In years of abundant water, large supplies are derived to ail main
waterways branching off the Chao Phraya river in Chai Nat, and the upper delta can extract
water first.
FIGURE 4: EVOLUTION OF THE AREA CROPPED WITH RICE IN THE DRY-SEASON
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These cropping areas can be translated in terms of cropping intensities. Calculations are
based on the data collected and published by RID at the Project level. These data are not
deprived of errors7. However, apart from being the only data available, their quality can be
7 Several reservations must however be made. Data for the lower delta seem less reliable because the density of
field staff is much lower (no zonernen) and no map is available ta really determine the cropping area. The
assessment of cropping intensity is aise obscured by the tact that cropping calendars are shifted and that the
distinction between wet and dry season is not aJways dear-<:ut Sorne areas may grow only a OS crop and no WS
crop, distorting the calculation of the patential rice area. This is responsible for sorne imprecision in the West
Bank, notably Chao Chet and Phrayabanlue Projects and also affects Pho Phya project (which southern tip is on
the same hydrological regime as the West Bank) and Phak Hai Project (which in the last 10 years has undergone
a drastic shift frorn WS floating rice mOl'lO-Cfopping towards dry-season HYV rice cropping). What is the patential
rice area is net always precisely known. Taking the (running) maximum rice area cultivated CNer :3 years is not
always correct because there might be sorne fallow land. In Chao Chet Bang Yeehon Project, for example, the
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.considered reasonably good, particularly when one acknowledges the difficulty of the task of
recording land use data (see Molle et al. 1998).
Several types of cropping intensity indices can be calculated (Table 1). The average rice
cropping intensity is the ratio between the dry-season + wet season rice areas and the
estimated potential rice area. Considering the upper and lower delta, aggregated figures give
indices of 1.34 and 1.44 respectively, with an average for the delta of 1.38. Cropping
intensity can also be computed considering adding field crops (Fe) to the wet+dry season
rice area. This entails an average increment of the indice of 0.02 for the upper delta. It can
also be computed by considering the total non-rice area under cultivation, including fruit
trees, year-round vegetable production, sugar cane and aquaculture (Tot). The average
indices [OS rice + WS rice + FC + 2*Tot]/[Potential irrigated area], or the Total cropping
intensit/, is given in Table 1. It reveals that for the period running from 1981 to 1999, the
total cropping intensity has been 1.40 for the upper delta and 1.51 for the lower delta
(average 1.45). The same indices, calculated for the last 5 years, yields overail values of
1.57 and 1.70. In conclusion, the upper delta appears to have around 40% of its irrigated
area cropped during the dry season, with a rather high elasticity in case of abundant water
supply, while the lower delta is roughly half cultivated in the dry season. This last value,
however, is strongly influenced by the inclusion of Pasak Tai and Nakhon Luang Projects in
the East Bank, both with very low cropping intensity. It is further pulled downward by values
of DS rice area for the Rangsit Tai projects which are believed to be underrated. If we
account for these two factors and restrict ourselves to the lower East Bank (Rice CI 1.50),
combined with the West Bank (Rice CI of 1.70), we find a more realistic cropping intensity of
1.60 for the lower delta, and around 1.80 for the last 5 years. The total crop intensity index is
at 1.65 for the lower delta (1981-1999). The temporal variation of the delta rice cropping
intensity is given in Figure 5.
TABLE 1: CROPPING INTENSITY INDEXES
Rice cropping Rice + Fe crop. Total cropping Rice cropping Total cropping
intensity Intensity intensity intensity intensity
Period 1981-1999 1995-99
Upper delta 1,34 1,36 1,40 1,52 1,57
Lower delta 1,44 1.45 1,51 1,63 1,70
Total delta 1,38 1,40 1,45 1,57 1,63
official irrigated area is 406.000 rai but the maximum rice area is 310.000 rai. The difference includes non-rice
crops, fallow land, and areas changed to built-up. Triple cropping (only recorded since 1998 but much older) also
makes things more difficult.
8 Note that perennial crops are multiplied by two. This is because the cropping intensity indexes considered here are
relative to a seasonal rice crop, not to absolute soil occupancy along the year. Full rice double cropping gives an indice
of 2, whereas a soil occupancy index would be close to 0.65. Perennial crops are supposed to be equivalent to two
crops of rice.
The Chao Phraya Delta: Historical C!'!.velopment, Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand's Rice Bowl
386
François Molle et al. Dry season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin ...
FIGURE 5: AVERAGE RICE CROPPING INTENSITY FOR THE DELTA (1980-199)
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The contrast mentioned earlier regarding the upper and the lower deltas is likely to be
sharpened when observing the smaller scale of the Project level. This readily defines a
spatial heterogeneity, both year by year and on the average over 20 years, which translates
in terms of (in)equity. The quality of the access to water is governed by several factors,
including physical, technical and political, which contribute to shaping the spatial pattern of
water allocation.
The first index considered here:
C/1 = [(OSrice + WSrice + F. Crops + 2*Perenials)/agricultural potential cropping area]
is indicative of the effective benefit drawn from DS cropping (or irrigation) by a given project
with its specifie constraints ; it includes ail crops and takes the agricultural potential cropping
area 'or one season as a unit. Figure 7 displays the spatial variation of CI1 both for the 1981-
1999 period and the 1995-1999 period. The west of the delta appears to be characterised by
much higher indices than the east (especially upper east). The pattern was changed in the
last 5 years (with an increase of the cropping intensity in the lower delta) but, while ail indices
are on the rise, the central and eastern upper-delta still do not reap the full benefice of
irrigation.
The Project total cropping intensities just shown are partly biased by the fact that the rice
area in the dry-season has been implicitly compared with the potential rice area in the wet
season: this does not take into account the fact that some projects encompass f10ating rice
areas which are deprived of on-farm infrastructures (ditch, levelling, bunding) and which,
therefore, are not candidate to DS cropping.
CI2 =[1+(OS rice + F.Crops)/potential rice area in the dry-season],
The Chao Phraya Delta: Historieal Development, Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand's Riee Bowl
387
François Molle etaI, Dry season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin",
compares rice cropping intensities on the sole area which can, technically, achieve double-
cropping: this serves as a formai index of spatial equity9.
The values of CI2 by Project are displayed in Figure 6. Inequalities regarding Projects10 partly
deprived of on-farm infrastructures have been reduced but the sheer contrast have not
disappeared. For the last 5 year period1\ the magnitude is raised but the order is slightly
modified. The spatial patterns of inequity in cropping intensity evidenced remain whatever
variation of the index is considered.
FIGURE 6: CI2, RICE+FIELD CROPS INTENSITY INDEX (1981-1999 AND 1995-1999)
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9 This indice, however, creates difficulties for projects which are not fully cropped in the wet season (upper west bank,
Phak Hai, Phophya), It is therefore applied only to the projects which do have restrictions of on-farm infrastructure.
10 Namely: Maharat, Yangmanee, Roeng Rang, Kok Katiem, Pasak Tai, Nakhon Luang, and to a much lesser extend
Chanasutr, Borommathad, Chong Kae, Bang Bal.
11 The indice is only for rice (Field crops non inciuded)
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TABLE 2: CROPPING INTENSITY INDEXES, BY PROJECT
Dry season water allocation in the Chao Phraya basin ...
Project Rice Rice + FC Total Rice Total Rice + FC Rice %of area with
CI CI CI CI CI correct CI correct CI no on-farm
Period 1981-99 1995-99 1995-99 1995-99 %
Borommathad 1,40 1,42 1,40 1,64 1,68 1,44 1,72 5
Chanasutr 1,40 1,40 1,36 1,38 1,48 1,45 1,53 10
Chong Kae 1,15 1,19 1,18 1,38 1,38 1,23 1,48 20
Donjedee 1,54 1,55 1,51 1,66 1,77 1,55 1,77 0
Khok Katiem 1,15 1,19 1,18 1,27 1,26 1,32 1,42 39
Maharat 1,15 1,18 1,18 1,29 1,28 1,24 1,37 25
Manorom 1,32 1,33 1,32 1,55 1,57 1,34 1,60 5
Pho Phaya 1,48 1,48 1,46 1,71 1,77 1,48 1,77 0
Pollathep 1,62 1,62 1,61 1,75 1,76 1,64 1,78 3
Roeng Rang 1,05 1,11 1,10 1,15 1,11 1,13 1,13 15
Samchuk 1,61 1,62 1,52 1,63 1,79 1,62 1,79 0
Thabote 1,59 1,59 1,56 1,81 1,89 1,59 1,89 0
Yangmanee 1,15 1,16 1,15 1,17 1,19 1,23 1,27 30
Nakhon Luang 1,02 1,03 1,03 1,08 1,08 1,07 1,21 60
Pasak Tai 1,11 1,12 1,11 1,13 1,14 1,14 1,16 15
Phak Hai 1,06 1,08 1,08 1,20 1,20 1,18 1,45 55
Bangbal 1,03 1,06 1,05 1,06 1,05 1,23 1,20 75
Chao Ched Bang Yeehon 1,45 1,44 1,41 1,75 1,84 1,44 1,84 0
Khlong Dan 1,36 1,37 1,29 1,49 1,59 1,37 1,59 0
Pasicharoen 1,62 1,63 1,32 1,16 1,51 1,63 1,51 0
Phra Ong Chai Ya Nue 1,66 1,66 1,59 1,60 1,70 1,66 1,70 0
Phrapimol 1,88 1,88 1,74 1,79 1,98 1,88 1,98 0
Phrayabanlue 1,84 1,84 1,76 2,20 2,34 1,84 2,34 0
Rangsit Nua 1,37 1,37 1,23 1,24 1,56 1,37 1,56 0
RangsitTai 1,46 1,46 1,44 1,51 1,56 1,46 1,56 0
TOTAL upper delta 1,34 1,36 1,33 1,48 1,52
TOTAL lower delta 1,44 1,45 1,38 1,53 1,63
TOTAL 1,38 1,40 1,36 1,50 1,57
g.4 Wat(!t ~upply and ctopping at(!a
Water supply (the sum of irrigation and effective rainfa/f) can be compared with the total
cropping area in order to derive standards of water use and to evidence differences between
Projects or variations- over time. The upper delta has been divided in 12 hydraulic units12; in
the lower delta, water balances are precarious. There is a significant inflow, both by gravity
and by pumping, into the West Bank from the Tha Chin river (which receives water from the
Mae Klong system) and unknown flows from/to the Chao Phraya River. The East Bank
receives less water from its bordering rivers. The inflow from Bang Pakong is discontinued in
late January and is partly substituted by pumping.
12 The Roeng Rang and Kok Katiem projects can be separated for aspects of rice cropping but must be pooled for water
balance: they thus form the RR+KK section.
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Dry season water allocatIon in the Chao Phraya basin ...
FIGURE 7: SPATIAL RICECROPPING INTENsITY(1981-1999 AND 1995-1999)
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Water balances can be achieved for hydraulic units which have records of inflows and
outflows. Inflows are recorded five times a day at ail the main regulators of the distribution
network. Return f10ws to the drainage systems are unfortunately unknown. There are a few
reasons to believe that these are not of any significant magnitude in the dry season: at the
plot level, the great majority of farmers have to pump water from the ditch and they are
eagerly combating any loss out of their plot of a scarce water. At the Project level, manyof
the main and secondary drains are equipped with regulators in order to better retain water in
the dry season (they capture superficial and sub-superficial run-off), and little water is passed
on to downstream areas. Return 1l0ws remain much probably under the 10% threshold. The
delta may also get sorne inflow from adjacent upland areas in case of heavy rainfall. The
sections and months concerned have been discarded.
Several possible sources of error impair the accuracy of the estimation of both water supply
and cropping areas13 but estimates of overall seasonal consumption can nevertheless be
attempted. Figure 8 shows that (the year 1999 excluded) the average of irrigation water use
in the upper delta is 1700 m3/rai and that there is a declining trend over the years. This
decline can be explained by: 1) An increased water use efficiency at the plot level, fostered
by the growing pressure on the water resource and by the growing use of individual pumping
at the plot level (which strongly encourages water savings); 2) an increased use of shallow
tube-wells; 3) a trend towards shifting cropping calendars earlier in the rainy season. This
very significantly decreases water use for land preparation (see more on that in § 5). It also
shifts an increasing part of the crop cycle out of the January-June period and consequently
underestimates the water effectively used by this crop; 4) a growing use of shorter duration
rice varieties, especially in triple cropping areas.
The anomaly observed for the year 1999 is mostly due to the fact that most farmers, knowing
about planned water restrictions, still wanted to benefit from high rice prices and started their
dry-season crop very early, in the October-December period. Considering rainfall raises the
total amount of water received by a rai of rice-equivalent to 1929 m3. These values should be
slightly incremented to account for the area cropped out of the January-June reference
period.
13 : inaccurate hydraulic formulas, or the use of the latter in situations where their precision is not ensured; pumps
providing unrecorded inflows; errors of reading (gauge), recording (in books) and, in some cases, ad-hoc over or
underreporting. To simplify the water balance, we have expressed the cropping area in terms of rice-equivalent. In
what follows, coefficients of 0.4 for field cropslvegetables, 0.7 for sugar cane, and 1 for orchards and aquaculture
have been used. Another difficulty is linked to our limited knowledge of cropping calendars in the dry·season.
While we consider the amount of water delivered during the first six months of the year (January-June), calendars
- including staggering - may sometimes be shorter, while in other instances they may start before January or end
later than June. The impossibility to specify this point over two decades has led us to simplify the water balance,
at the expense of some accuracy. We will compare the total cropping areas by section (based on RID reports, by
Projects) and the amount of water supplied (irrigation + effective rainfall) over the January-June period. Aiso
unknown is the share of water distributed by the irrigation network which is used for domestic purposes (other
than agriculture). It has been assumed that this non-agricultural use amounted to between 5 and 10% in the
upper delta, and 15% in the southern delta (golf courts, etc).
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FIGURE 8: AVERAGE IRRIGATION WATER CONSUMPTION PER RAI IN THE DRY SEASON (1977-99)
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Over the 1977-1999 period 11.64 million ha (72.7 million rai) of rice-equivalent have been
cropped in the whole delta during the dry-season. The corresponding irrigation water suppl/4
amounted to 86 billion m3 The overall estimated effective rainfall is 16 billion m3 . This gives
an overail average of 1180 m3/rai, or 1400 m3/rai including rainfall. These values should be
corrected by a factor of 1.15-1.25, according to the year, to account for the area partly
cropped out of the January-June reference period. This gives an average cansumptian af
water per rai around 1600 m3, ar 10, 000 m3/ha, with a significant spatial variability and a
slight temparal decline, from which 15% is pravided by rainfa/l.
A similar analysis can also be made for each hydraulic unit. It can be shown that water
consumption varies widely (between 1,500 and 3,000 m3/rai), in part because some sub-
areas have an unknown and non recorded part of supply from other sources (notably tube
wells), head or tail-end location, higher conveyance loss, and difference in cropping
calendar.
4 Pte!:ent planning and allocation
4.1 Conttol of watet u~e in the ba~in
One of the main constraints to both planning and management is the growing share of
uncontrolled water abstraction in the rivers, between the dams and Chai Nat. This includes
approximately 300 groups of farmers using pumps implemented by the Oepartment of
Energy Promotion and RIO mid-scale projects.
A quantitative estimation of how much water is withdrawn from the rivers before they reach
Chai Nat, at the apex of the delta can be made by cons idering the water balance between
14 plus contributions fram the Bang Pakong and Tha Chin rivers and fram tube-wells (mostly in the northern part of
the upper delta). Over a long period, however, shallow aquifers can be considered to be greatly replenished by
irrigation; therefore they correspond to recycling within the basin, not to additional supply fram outside the system.
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the dams releases and the Flow at Nakhon Sawan, a few kilometers before Chai Nat, during
the driest period: February-March-April. Ouring these three months sideflows are extremely
limited. Ali are dubbed here "water loss", with reference to the delta15 . Figure 9 shows that
while water abstraction in the middle basin was only around 5% of the dams releases in the
70's, it has now increased to, say, 25%, with a peak of 38% in 1998 ! This includes
"controlled" uptake by RIO in Phitsanulok project (since 1982), as indicated in the figure, and
in the Lower Ping area (since 1990), but also accounts for the growth of scattered private
pumps. The figure (right) also provides an estimate of the growth of the cropping area in the
medium basin.
FIGURE 9: COMPARISON OF THE 2 DAMS RELEASE AND THE AMOUNT OF WATER REACHING CHAINAT (FEB. TO
APRIL)
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A similar phenomena of semi-controlled water abstraction is also developing on the margins
of the delta proper. On the Western side, along the Makham-Uthong canal, these areas are
now estimated at 80.000 rai. Large ditches branching from the main canal have been dug as
far as several kllometres and several pumping units can be observed along the canal (many
of them belonging to RIO). In the Chong Kaew Project, on the east, fruit growers have
installed very powerful pumps along Chai Nat-Pasak canal and even sell water to some other
farmers ! ln the lower delta, uncontrolled abstraction from golf-courses, real estates, etc. is
also wide spread. These examples show that there is at present a growing loss of control on
water use in the basin (who, when, how much), partly provoked by the uncoordinated
initiatives of various Oepartment, which make proper management increasingly problematic.
4.2 ~otmal ~te-!:ea!:Of1 ~laf1f1if1g
ln 1981, the Cabinet appointed the Dry Season Cropping Promotion Committee chaired by
the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare an annuai plan, objectives and promoting measures for
dry-season cropping. A sub-committee was appointed to collect relevant data and, each
year, prepare a plan. After acceptation of the plan, users and agencies would know the plan
for dams release and operate accordingly (Binnies, 1997). Ouring the 1991-1994 drought
15 This does not mean that the delta should necessarily be favoured. However, if we consider that it infrastructures are
the oldest and that irrigation had been planned based on the available water resources, it is also legitimate to reekon
that later sehemes have in fact been built based on the same water resource and that they depleted the initial share of
the delta. This has to be questioned on the ground of elementary eeonomie logie.
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period, it proved impossible ta manage the system according ta the plan and the committee
ended its work. However the sub-committee continues ta meet yearly in arder ta. achieve
some co-ordination between agencies.
Normally, at the end of the year (November), the sub-committee (or working group), with
representatives from the various Ministries involved (MOAC, OOAE, RIO, EGAT, OEP, etc.)
is convened with the aim ta examine the situation for the whole country and ta define the
national policy for the coming dry-season. Data are presented by several technical Offices
and a preliminary target is set up for the dry season area cultivation. The policy is mostly
based on the projection of the active water storage for the 1st of January presented by EGAT.
On its side, RIO (regional offices) has consulted the Provincial agricultural services and
cames out with a crude pre-repartition of the area by Province, with areas broken down
according ta crops (rice, field crops, trees) and water status (irrigated/non irrigated). Some
other aspects are discussed and may also be taken into consideration (this year the Office of
Agricultural Economies warned that rice priees were declining and that the planting area
should be controlled; in 1996 and 1997, supplies were increased ta compensate for the flood
damage undergone during the preceding wet season, etc.). The share of water which can be
pumped by OEP pumping stations along the river is also specified. These recommendations
are further endorsed and made official by the Dry Season Committee, of which the minister
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operative (MOAC) is chairman.
The principal figure presented ta the meeting is the assessment of the available water for the
next dry season (projection of the water stock on the 1st of January). This Available Volume,
or active storage, (hereafter called AV) is expressed in billion m3 and generally varies
between 5 and 15 billions m3, but happened ta be as low as 3.6 billion in 1980 and 2 billion
m3 in 1992. From the available volume AV (which gives an indication of whether the coming
dry-season is ta be considered "dry", "normal" or "wet"), a Target Volume (TV) of water
release for the January-June period is issued. TV is only a part of AV because of the need of
inter-annual regulation and the risk ta lack water in the early rainy season, when
requirements sometimes offset natural f10ws or precipitations. There is, however, no definite
standard on how much water must be kept at the end of the dry-season, but 2-3 billion m3 is
a minimum basis. The value of TV is transformed in cropping area, following a thumb rule of
1,600 m3/rai. This Target Area (hereafter TA) is expressed in rai and generally varies
between 2 ta 3.5 million rai.
The relationships between AV, TV and TA are grounded on past experience and are
approximately based on the following rules (RIO, pers. corn.):
Active storage AV > 108m3, released plan TV = 6.5-7.5 8m3; for paddy area TA= 3.1 - 3.3 M.rai
Active storage AV = 7.5-10 8m3, released plan TV = 68m3; for paddy area TA::::: 3.0 M.rai
Active storage AV = 5-7.5 8m3, released plan TV = 48m3; for paddy area TA::::: 2.0 M.rai
Active storage AV < 58m3, released plan for domestic use and other constraints only.
The global release target TV is subsequently distributed among the various water uses within
the basin, namely domestic use, BMA, transportation, control of salinity intrusion, irrigation,
with the latter broken down by IRO Region. A weekly calendar of water release is prepared
by the regional offices, with the constraint that the total of the weekly releases equate the
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amount allocated to each of them for the 6 months. Each region also specifies the weekly
releases for each of the main canals included in it, together with the cropping area targets for
each Project.
Projects are requested to draw maps of target areas, considering areas with possible loss in
the rainy season (flood, grasshoppers, etc), to plan the use of RI D'S mobile pumping stations
and to set a weekly calendar for water supply in ail the main canals in the Project. Ali these
activities, however, have little or no impact on the already planned schedule and on real
water distribution. In parallel, each Project organises meetings at the zone16 level in order to
inform farmers about the cropping area allocated to their zone. This is generally done
together with the gate keepers, zonemen and sub-district extensionists. Rather than the
figure itself, farmers first give attention to the overall policy adopted: "it is prohibited to planf',
"there is /ittle water this year' or "this year, water is gooC!' form the basic "hearsay scale" on
which farmers rely in order to decide to engage in cropping or not. The cropping area
announced is also taken as an indication but it is considered together with further advice
from officers which qualifies the risk. Project Officers tend to be conservative on the latter as
a protective measure against a possible drastic water shortage Iying beyond their control.
They commit themselves to ensure water supply for a limited area, but at the same time may
suggest that a larger cropping area is likely to be possible.
4.2 Plan tevi~ion~ and opetational teal-time adiu~tment~
ln sorne instances however, peculiar conditions may cali for the revision of the whole plan.
This generally occurs at the beginning of the season, in January or early February. Two
instances of adjustments in the planned weekly calendar have recently occurred (and are
probably representative of the two main causes of plan revision): discrepancies between.
technical and political criteria of target setting (1999); severe mismatch between the planned
schedule and effective crop progress (2000).
ln summary, the allocation process can be typified as supply-driven, guided by experience
rather than by clear-cut technical parameters, somewhat flexible rather than rigidly pre-
determined. It focuses on the allocation at macro level, with little control on the day-to-day
fluctuations experienced at the lower levels but with a concern not to stray too much from the
weekly planning, as a way to ensure that the total water released at the end of June do not
differ from the overall target by more than, say, 15%. Water supply at lower levels (Iaterals) is
very loosely defined and uncertain.
After the setting of weekly dams release targets, first at the onset of the season, then with
possible - although rare - in-season adjustments, RID officers focus their attention upon
day-to-day water management. Although EGAT happens to release water amounts very
close to those requested (more on this later), irrigation managers have to cope with three
kinds of uncontrolled perturbations: pumping irrigation in the middle basin; hectic cropping
16 A sub-unit of a Project (approximately 1000-1500 ha)
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calendar; climatic events. The first perturbation, and partly the third (possible sideflows in
May and June), impact on the discharge eventually reaching Chai Nat dam.
FIGURE 10: PLANNING REVISION IN THE DRY-SEASON 1999 AND 2000
...
""
....-
...
nr\.
Z5 .... 31••7~ -~...."' ....
.......
... 1 \ lIlll
r-u I~ ~ 1 \ i~JJ r 1 1 i
""
r lIlll 1 ....
1 ~;I \ 9 1 ~r- .... 1 \\1200 ...... l-I ~. ..:;::;, J LI \l,.. 1 : 3.41 Bm3 1...L.fl. =,\~ .- \f 15'-.31.57 - f ...- :..
"XI ~ 200- \- ,2,1Bm3 ......... \
..
~ "XI ......0 ,.J1 0
... ~ ••• <f<f ~##~~~~~~~~~~~$~,Jo .-1' .! , ... ~ ••'<f<f ~#.~~of'.of'~~~ .. ~~~,• .!' ... , Jo ••••of',
An irregular inflow at Chai Nat translates into fluctuations of the water level upstream of the
dam. This further disrupts the discharge of ail the regulators which control the waterways
branching off the Chao Phraya river, upstream of Chai Nat dam, most especially in those
which sill level is high. Figure 11 shows that rivers have no problems to get water when the
level drops but that most canals do. The main reasons for such fluctuations are the
uncontrolled water use in the middle basin and the decrease in dam releases during the
week end. As the demand for energy diminishes (many factories and offices close), EGAT
reduces releases accordingly. This effect takes approximately 5 days to materialise in Chai
Nat dam. In order to limit this phenomena, EGAT has agreed to maintain daily releases
during the week end over 60% of the average value for the week considered. Nevertheless,
disruptions are still perceptible and resented by RID officers17.
FIGURE 11: WATERWAYS SILL LEVELS AT CHAINAT (IN M MSL) AND FLUCTUATIONS OF THE WATER LEVEL
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Daily data for the dry-seasons of the years 1994 (dry) to 1998 (wet) are used here to show
the extent of these fluctuations upstream of Chai Nat dam: 1994 stiçks out as very
problematic year in which virtually no irrigation water was supplied and the water level
17 It appears that the lower releases on week-ends are somewhat dampened on the way. If we look at the daily
dam releases for each of the weeks of the 1998 dry-season, we find that in fact there are slumps on Sundays. On
the average over the 26 weeks, the decrease is 61 % of the week average, that is almost exactly the value agreed
upon. However, 5 weeks have Sunday releases under 55%, with 3 of them under 50% ofthe week average.
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remained below 14.50 m M8L, this is 2 meters below 16,5 m, the full-supply design level
used in the wet-season. In "normal" dry-seasons, the level is generally fluctuating between
15.5 and 16.0 m. Other years also show significant fluctuations and difficulties to ensure a
proper level, especially during January and February.
ln normal situations, Project managers ensure/adopt a continuous flow to ail their laterals. If
the policy is to follow a year-by-year rotation in which half of the Project only is supposed to
grow rice, then the f10w to the other half is maintained low, but rarely cut, at least in the head
reach. How these limited f10ws are compatible with classical earth canals equipped with
sluice gated regulators and designed to provide gravity f10ws to laterals at the full supply
level is not readily obvious to the observer. In fact, situations vary according to topographical
features but the most common case is that of farmers compensating for the lack of gravity
now to their FTOs (Farm Tum Out) by using individual pumping devices. If operational
constraints experienced by RID have forced farmers to deve/op theïr pumping capacity, it is
al/ the more true that this - in retum - has discouraged whatever regu/ation improvements
R/D wou/d have otherwise been pushed to achieve. Rotational arrangements are part of the
paraphemalia but as their implementation entails significant transaction costs, RID officers
understandingly prefer the actuaJ statu quo according to which their role is to ensure water in
the canal, even at the bottom of it, while farmers have implicitly integrated the fact that they
will need pumping devices to access water.
The development of the individual pumping capacity has been paramount in easing water
management in the dry-season and in providing farmers with the f1exibility to easily access
any pounding or f10wing water. On the negative side, it is equivalent to substituting
managerial exigencies for increased monetary costs (pumping equipment and operation),
which burden is bome by the farmers. A more subtle negative aspect of this process has also
been the strengthening of a pervasive individualistic conception of gaining access to water.
Although collective arrangements are sometimes necessary and implemented, there is
ample evidence that individual pumping has implicitly reinforced the acceptance that
locational advantages necessarily translate into a privileged access to water: head enders
can pump water as soon as it appears, in total independence from a possible collective
rotational arrangement or other efforts aimed at raising the water level in the canal or
increasing equity.
The way, in a context of rather high uncertainty, supply and demand adjust to one another is
not obvious and cannot be easily reduced to the classic distinction between a demand-driven
process (supply is adjusted to a given demand) and a supply-driven one (inflows are fixed
and known in advance and the irrigated area is calculated accordingly). A careful analysis
shows that it may in fact be a blend of both, with a delicate and f1uctuating dosage of
ingredients.
Let us schematised the objectives, constraints, risks and trump cards of the main two parts
concemed. Farmers, unless rice prices be really depressed, usually attempt to grow a dry-
season rice area as large as possible, two times or more if possible. They must evaluate the
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risk of doing so according to information given by RIO and media. By starting their crop
massively and/or by resorting to secondary water sources, they will force RIO to supply their
crops until the end of the cycle. In case of drastic shortage, they may request local politicians
to intervene in order to get an extra supply.
On their side, RIO officers both want to serve their farmers and minimise risk. In sorne
instances the second aspect may override the tirst one and officers are Iikely to adopt
strategies aimed at limiting the expansion of the cropping area. In sorne instances, they are
seen opening middle reach check regulators, allegedly to provide consumption water to
downstream areas, but in reality to prevent upstream areas to grow too large an area, which
wouId dramatically increase the risk of future shortage. For officers, shortage means farmers'
unrest, political interventions and hierarchical superiors possibly asking for explanations, ail
things which must be avoided as much as possible. Their margin of f1exibility lies in a certain
degree of slack in water allocation: they may sometimes allocate poorly reported extra water
supplies through releases into drains, by setting pumps along the rivers or by treating them
as "upaphok-boriphoK' (domestic consumption) water. Under-reporting may also occur in
times of tighter quota monitoring. An important protective measure is to commit to a low
standard target area, in order to transfer risk-taking ante farmers, while giving off-record
indications on how much risk should be reasonably taken. This is why RIO officers are
reluctant to plan large areas, even in their demand channelled to the Regional Office.
This system is served by the implicit philosophy conveyed by the development of individual
pumping. By fostering the acceptance that farmers along the canal do gain privileged access
to water, it chokes claims of greater equity, with their cohort of demanding measures, and fits
RIO's concern to control the expansion of the cropping area: if the first-pumping-first-served
principle is endorsed, then any water fIow in the laterals will swiftly translate into a green
"glove pattern" rice area. The width and the length of each "til1ger" depends on the flow itself,
the roughness of the canal, topography and the pumping capacity of the farmers along its
banks.
Should this be seen in a negative fashion ? Ooes not, after ail, pumping lead to a very
efficient water use at the plot level and ensure that even limited f10ws are fully made use of ?
It may also be ideally adapted to a water supply characterised by its irregularity and
sometimes, uncertainty. However positive these aspects may be, this is achieved at the
expense of equity, which will be touched upon later.
The total amount of water to be released by the dams during the six month period running
from January to June is the key parameter of the allocation process and of the inter-annual
dam management. In normal years, this amount is usually around 6 or 7 billion m3. The year
1996 set a record close to 10 billion, while two years of crisis have received less than 4
billion m3 (1980 and 1994).
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4.5.1 What technical guideline for the determination of the Target Volume?
It stands to reason that the determination of the target volume(TV), that is the total amount of
water to be released during the January-June period, is a direct measure of the risk
perceived and accepted. This risk is dependent upon the "intensity" of the demand (farmers
and political pressure). If a low value of TV is chosen, then there will be enough water to
regulate whatever situation may arise in the coming months. On the contrary, if most of the
available water is released, we run the risk that water requirements will be high during the
next wet-season, which generally goes together with a low run-off into the dams.
Uncertainty remains about how much water will have to be used in the following wet season.
On average, monthly sideflows are higher than corresponding monthly requirements and
most of the inflow in the dams can be stored. Statistically, however, "dry" months occur
frequently and dam water must be released to supplement both rainfall and sideflows. In ail
cases the dams water balance in the rainy season will be positive but the net stock gain, 4.7
8m3 in a median year, may be as low as 1.5 8m3 one year out of ten. In the next dry
season. however, dams release will have to amount at least to a f100r value of 2-2.5 8m3.
Therefore. there is a risk of having an overall yearly deficit of at least 18m3 (or more if
releases in the dry-season happen to be higher than the f100r value).
Risk will be lowered if the carry-over stock kept at the end of the dry-season (f1oor value FV)
is increased. It appears that at the moment there is no agreed upon value which should not
be trespassed. It therefore gives way to conflicting interpretations between the
farrners/politicians, who tend to see immediate benefit, and project managers, who are afraid
of the major disrupting consequences of a possible drastic shortage or of a dam emptying.
How the target volume TV translates into cropping area is another "quiz". As the relationship
is poorly known. it is difficult to estimate a realistic target area TA: consequently it is difficult
to follow a decision-making allocation process based on cropping area.
Figure 12 shows the theoretical relationships between the available water and cropping
areas, as estimated by Acres (1979) and. more recently, by Pal & Panya (2000). The
difference between the two curves in an interesting indication of the initial under-evaluation of
the cropping area; the figure also shows the observed historical values. The years 1975 and
1976, with cropping areas much under the potential, are indicative of an early development
of dry-season cropping. The years 1999 and 2000, on the other hand, have yielded
extremely high cropping areas. This reflects, among other factors, a sharpening of the trend
to advance cropping calendars (therefore an increasing part of the rice area is started before
the 1st of January), a better registration of triple cropping and possibly an increase in the use
of 3 month cycle rice varieties. Discrepancies also account for errors in reporting and for the
fact that the water eventually released during the dry season may differ from the
"sustainable" values assumed in the models.
To analyse what has been the effective allocation in the past, it is interesting to first examine
how the active storage volume on the 1st of January and the 1st of July relate to the amount
of water effectively released during the dry-season. We may consider the magnitude of the
drawdown of the dams active storage between the 1st of January and the 1st of July (this also
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considers dams inflow). displays the corresponding values classified by magnitude and also
shows the initial and final stored volumes. The lower figure shows these drawdowns
classified according ta the final volume (1 st of July). The years 1974, 1975 and 1976 stand at
the extreme right. In those years, Sirikit dam had just been set into operation and water
demand in the dry-season was still limited. It is less clear why, for example, the year 1986
only sees a release of 58m3, while almost 88m3 are still available at the end of the dry-
season; or why the year 1983 starts with more than 108m3 but releases sa much water that
only 1.4 8m3 remains 6 months later, incurring in sorne high risk.
FIGURE 12: GUIDELINES FOR SEASONAL ALLOCATION, AND
OBSERVED VALUES
FIGURE 13: ACTIVE STORAGE DRAWDOWN BETWEEN THE 1ST OF
JANUARY AND JULY, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE MAGNITUDE
OF DRAWDOWN AND TO THE FINAL ACTIVE STORAGE
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From ail these observations, it follows that the effective deliveries in the dry-season, although
widely governed by the available stored water, does not follow a very strict rule. Significant
variations are evidenced between the years, even for similar initial stocks of water. These
can be attributed ta the fact that the technical criteria is somewhat loose and that it is often
challenged by more political decisions which refiect the intensity of demand, itself widely
correlated ta the priee of rice. Such interventions, together with poor control of cropping
calendars, which sometimes forces RID ta supply water ta crops already planted, lead in
sorne instances ta very hjgh levels of risk for the ensuing seasons.
Figure 14 shows that the available water (over the dead storage volume) is in most years
significantly higher than the amount of water released. This mirrors the will of interanual
regulation and/or the limits of the diversion capacity. The lower (thicker) curve compares
these first two values with the total amount of water released during the end of the rainy
season (September ta December). It shows that the 1980 crisis was partly generated by the
undue release of 4 billion m3 during these four months. This was also the case in 1991 and in
1994, as highlighted by the lower part of the figure which expresses the amount of water
released in percentage of the remaining water on the first of January.
From ail these observations, it follows that the effective deliveries in the dry-season, although
widely governed by the available stored water, does not follow a very strict rule. Significant
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variations are evidenced between the years, even for similar initial stocks of water. These
can be attributed to the fact that the technical criteria is somewhat loose and that it is ofien
challenged by more political decisions which reflect the intensity of demand, itself widely
correlated to the price of rice. Such interventions, together with poor control of cropping
calendars, which sometimes forces RID to supply water to crops already planted, lead in
sorne instances to very high levels of risk for the ensuing seasons.
FIGURE 14: SEASONAL RELEASE COMPARED W1TH AVAILABLE WATER (1972-1999)
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There are several difficulties in determinîng the most opportune amount of water to be
released in the dry-season. One aspect is whether the dams release (and the cropping area)
is allowed to take totally different values every year! depending on the stock, or whether it is
preferable to have a constant average target, from which will be departed only in exceptional
years (very low active storage). Although this problem is classical, there are very few, if any,
examples of policy favouring stabilitytequity instead of instabilitytefficiency.
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5 hn~toving f!quity and f!fficif!ncy in allocation and rnanagf!rnf!nt
5.1 Dam~ management
5.1.1 Dams releases vs. downstream requirements
The logics of dam management for irrigation and energy generation are different in sorne
respects but not totally antagonist. RIO wants water to be delivered in the dry-season AND in
the rainy season - most especially the months of July, August and September - , when and if
the rainfall pattern entails specifie requirements. These requirements will depend on local
rainfall but, above ail, on the amount of side-f1ows generated in the basin downstream of the
dams and upstream of the main irrigated areas. Contrarily to cornmon wisdom, this latter
requirement is by no mean smail and, should sideflows be insufficient, large amounts of
water will have to be released by the dams during this period. In years of abundant runoff,
water releases are also commanded by concerns of flood control and dam safety. Ideally,
water should be stored during the rainy season as much as possible, and released during
drier months.
EGAT, on the other hand, is managing a wide diversity of energy generation plants, the
largest part of which is thermal based, with hydropower making approximately 8% of the
total. Ali the sources are not equivalent in terms of cost and f1exibility. Hydropower
generation is most especially appreciated for the facility of switching it on and off at will,
which is not conveniently feasible with thermal plants. It is therefore used to cope with peak
demands (generally during three periods in a given day: 9 to 11:00 a.m; 14:00 to 16:00, and
18:00 to 20:30) and with outages or emergency shut-down of thermal plants. These are
rather common (weekly occurrences) and the dam turbines are frequently solicited to "fill up
the blanks".
Should we fail to consider this aspect of scheduling and f1exibility, we would readily get to the
conclusion that the dams should be managed according to RID's logic: in fact, except for a
negligible share of water going through the spillways, the amount of water going through the
turbines remains basically unchanged in the long run, as ail of it (minus the loss) is sooner or
later eventually released. The total amount of power generated is therefore unchanged, but
for slight differences in the average head in the turbine18.
The comparison of the weekly water demands formulated each week to EGAT by RID with
effective release show that, during the dry season (and for the last six years data) there is a
rather close match between the two. EGAT is therefore following by and large the schedule
agreed upon. More generally, we can try to estimate the effective mismatch between dam
18 keeping more water in the rainy season leads to a higher average water stock and corresponding head in the
generators. On the other hand, loss by evaporation is increased, as the water body exposed to the sun is larger.
On the whole, energy gains or loss derived from changes in management are at best of the second order and, in
any case, not significant enough to govern, or even influence, the policy and schedule of water allocation and
release.
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releases and water use by looking at whether water is released in excess at Chai Nat dam
(that is to say in excess of downstream minimum requirements for Bangkok and salinity
control, in other words lost to the sea), independently of the planned values. This is unlikely
to happen in the dry season, as the available water is eagerly awaited by farmers along the
canals, but, rather, during the rainy season. Such possible water losses, however, may be
both controlled or uncontrolled. The different situations can be broken down in 6 cases:
Situation 1: ln the dry season, the system is supply oriented. A given amount of water is released by
the two dams (0), based on the stored volume. Irrigation (here includil1g ail water uses along canals:
Ir) adapts to the water supply and vice versa, but with much le55 elasticity in the second case. No
water is lost at Chai Nat'9.
Situation 2: if, in the situation, just described, water is released at Chai Nat in excess of a given
minimum threshold (rather generously chosen here as 80 cms), then the ditference is computed as a
control/ed water loss (to the sea) for the system. This is shown in red (case 1).
Situation 3: in the March-June period approximately (the later part of the dry season and early rainy
season), sorne significant natural sidefJows may occur in case of rainfall. If there is a situation of water
shortage, then sidefJows are added and incorporated to the deliveries. In other cases, this water may
be considered to reduce dam deliveries20. This can happen either because the manager wants to keep
the overall supply at the same level (giving more could trigger more planting in the dry season) or
because the demand is already satisfied (complement irrigation in the early wet season).
Situation 4: Because, for some reason, deliveries have not been reduced, the infJow at Chai Nat is
found to be exceeding demand (or the level of supply that RIO wants to maintain to avoid
overcropping). In that case, water must be passed on to the Chao Phraya river, resulting in control/ed
loss (case 2).
Situation 5: ln the rainy season, sidefJows may amount to huge discharges which exceed the needs
and/or the diversion capacity at Chai Nat. The excess water is passed on to the Chao Phraya river as
an uncontrol/ed loss.
Situation 6: if, in such a situation, water is released from the dams, this release will accrue to the
excess water and will not be used. If water is released because of dam safety reasons and/or because
of the will to limit the probability of unproductive spill (no energy generated), then these releases are
not considered as lost. If this is not the case, ail amounts released in excess of the minimum
requirements for ecological preservation and domestic use downstream of the two dams (1-2 million
m3/day/dam) are considered as control/ed loss (case 3).
Other situations: Without records of forced outages of EGAT's plants and of how much water had to
be released to cope with them, it is not possible to estimate how much of these losses must be
attributed to these emergency cases. Controlled releases triggered by a situation in which possible
future non-productive spill must be avoided - the water level in one of the dams is above the upper rule
curve - can be estimated based on the monthly values of this curve. This situation can be shown to be
quite rare: it occurred only once, in 1975, for the Bhumipol dam (together with some spill) and four
times for the Sirikit dam (in 1974, 1975, 1981 and 1995).
19 ln fact, there is often insufficient release at Chai Nat dam, sometimes provoking damage by salinity intrusion.
20 Especially if the deliveries in the first part of the dry-season have exceeded target values.
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This description may imperfedly represent ail the possible situations but it nevertheless
allows a categorisation of the different types of 1055 and an evaluation of their respective
shares within the overall Joss. These can be tentatively estimated based on monthly values
of the water balance in the basin.
Figure 15 provides the monthly averages of the three kinds of 1055, together with releases
motivated by spill-control, for the 1972-1999 period. As expeded, losses corresponding to
case 1 concentrate in the first five months of the year. Case 2 losses dominate in the June-
August period, while Case 3 losses are paramount in the September-Oecember period.
These losses are quite considerable in quantitative terms, especially in the rainy season. The
figure also reveals a complementary picture of the yearly total Ioss along the 1972-1999
period. We can observe: 1) a striking variability of the yearly total water 1055; 2) a decline of
the total loss, suggesting that a decreasing inflow paralleled by a growing demand have
fostered a stricter management of the dams; 3) that the decline affects the three types of
1055.
ln quantitative terms, the total average yearly loss amounts to 2.9 billion m3, or 30% of the
average inflow in the two dams, including releases for spill control together with effective spill
which amount to 350 million m3). Case 1 is rather limited in magnitude (291 million m3), while
Case 2 and Case 3 losses have similar magnitudes (1.06 and 1.12 billion m3 per year on
average).
FIGURE 15: WATER RELEASE AT CHAI NAT IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS: THEORETICAL LOSS (AVERAGE
MONTHLy VALUES AND YEARLY VALUES)
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As noticed earlier, the year 1996 sticks out as an horrendous counter-example of the
improved management, in terms of loss reduction, observed in the 1990s. More than 48m3
have been dumped to the sea. It can be observed that 1.3 8m3 have been released from the
dams in August, out of which 1.1 8m3 was lost to the sea21 . VVhat must also be emphasised,
however, is that many significant releases observed from April to September, despite the
occurrence of sorne rainfaIl , are in general motivated by irrigation requirements and are not,
as often c1aimed by outsiders, released for the sole objective of energy generation22.
21 The water level in Sirikit was quite high (between 145 and 149 m) but had not reached the spililevei (150.5 m).
It is believed that the 700 million m3 releases were a psychological consequence of the exceptional 1995 flood.
22 This approach, however, probably overestimate water losses. By considering monthly values, we ignore bath
the errors due to not considering carryover from one month to another (the water released the last flVe days of a
given month is used downstream the following month) and the more signiflcant constraints cA real day-to-day
management the Iagtime corresponding to adjusting releases to uncontrolled factOfS, including rainfall.
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5.1.2 Dissociating energy generation and other use
At the completion of the Sirikit dam in 1972, hydropower generation accounted for almost
one third of the total electricity produced in Thailand. Therefore, the rules and patterns of
dam management were designed with the objective to maximise energy generation. In
addition, supply was in excess of demand and EGAT was enjoying a significant degree of
"slack" which could be managed according to specific energy-generation requirements. This
situation can still be found in the Mae Klong (Satoh et al. 1999; Kositsakulchai et al. 1999)
but the situation in the Chao Phraya river basin is now clearly the opposite one. Yet, because
of the early orientation of dam management for energy generation and because of the
flexibility offered by the dams to compensate for forced outages of thermal power plants,
EGAT has continued to enjoy a certain liberty in managing the dams. We have seen earlier
that this margin of flexibility has been drastically reduced in the last 10 years. As water is
getting scarcer in the basin and conflicting interest arise, resources and their management
come under growing scrutiny.
Several elements suggest that it is now possible to adopt a management of dams based on
downstream requirement and not energy generation. 1) A first element is that hydropower
has undergone a dramatic decline in relative importance as a source of energy for Thailand.
From one third of the national production in the early seventies, it now amounts to only 8% of
it, and Bhumipol and Sirikit dams eventually represent only 4% of the national production; 2)
there is an overcapacity inherited from both the economic crisis and overrated projections
considered in the past (Watershed, 1999); 3) More flexible production with other dams (Laos)
or gaz turbine is or will soon be available (Independent Power Producers, Ratchaburi Plant),
which may offer most of the peak generation facility now provided by the dams. Giving
priority to downstream use will of course little alters the amount of energy produced (water
will still flow through the turbines) but will push EGAT to solve problems of plant outage by
using the overcapacity and not water from the dams, and answering to peak demand with
other dams or gaz turbines. Indeed it will be a recognition of the changes occurred in both
the power generation and water use sectors, and of the adjustments already made.
Other aspects of dam management should also receive attention. Dams release must be
responsive to variations in demand, in particular to those due to hydrologic events. Rainfall
and natural sideflows in the basin must be detected in real time, translated in projection of
inflow and dams releases must be attuned accordingly. The upper rule curve of the dams
must be revised in order to maximise the final stored volume rather than the total energy
generated. It must investigated whether tapping the dead volume of the Sirikit dam (only
justified to raise the head for energy generation) could be recognised as a normal procedure
and not as dramatic event.
5.2 RBcon!:idBting ctopping calBndat!:
Until the end of the 80's, most of the dry-season rice cropping and corresponding water
supply were scheduled from February onward. Only the Chachoengsao Province on the East
and the West Bank had different calendars (Kasetsart University and ORSTOM 1996): the
former would start dry-season cropping as early as late October, in order to complete it
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before February, when water gets salty in the Bang Pakong river. The later would attune its
calendar to the flood duration and perform one crop before and/o,-23 one after. In a year of
average flood, that is little water is stored in the West bank, which acts as a buffer, the area
with earlier crop establishment (Iate October) is located in the middle-east of the West Bank
(both higher land and better poldered area). As water recedes, rice is established, with the
lower/later parts located along the Tha Chin river. Ali calendars are delayed in case of
significant flood.
ln the upper delta, the dry-season traditionally began in February, but the most distant sub-
areas may start their crop as late as May. The last decade has witnessed a graduaI and
complete deregulation of the theoretical scheduling. This trend has been particularly obvious
in the West of the upper delta (Don Chedi, Samchok, Phophya24). It has been fostered by the
uncertainty as whether (Iate) deliveries would eventually come and/or be sufficient for a crop
of rice. Rather than waiting until late into the season, many chose to start their dry-season
crop in continuation of the wet-season one. Such a shift, in the footsteps of the West bank,
soon proved much advantageous. Farmers wouId capitalise on the residual field wetness to
cut the drastic peak need of water at land preparation time (between 250 and 300 mm in dry
soils conditions). They would also not only benefit from rather abundant water remaining in
the waterways until the end of December but also force RIO to maintain sorne supply to
sustain their crops during the period in which it should theoretically be suspended. While this
shift could have prompted a smooth and acknowledged adjustment of the water schedule, a
difficulty arose because of year-to-year variations, as the intensity of demand is linked to the
price of rice and its timing to whether the wet season preceding crop has been late
(sometimes delayed by a late preceding dry season crop) and, for the lower delta and Song
Phi Nong area, when water will recede.
The use of shallow wells (at least for one part of the cycle), has also contributed to
deregulating calendars. Farmers with very high cropping intensity acknowledge that they
don't even refer any more to conventional seasons (na-pii, na-prang). Mention is made of na-
pleng (the third crop) but others admit that they just don't know what growing-season they
follow.
This gain in flexibility has undoubtedly been one of the main factor responsible for the
records of cropping-areas observed ln the last dry-seasons. Nevertheless, it also blurred ail
the landmarks used hitherto for allocating water in the dry-season. This calls for the
necessity to first recognise these changes, then to incorporate them into the definition of a
more flexible and rational allocation process.
The choice of cropping calendars entails wide differences in absolute water requirements. It
must therefore be investigated how these have been fixed in the past and whether the logic
23 Sorne parts of the West Bank have long been growing only one wet-season or dry-season crop ; the generalisation of
double (or triple cropping) is rather recent and has been mostly allowed by the construction of pumping stations along
the Tha Chin River.
24 The southern tip of the Project (along Song Phinong river) follows a calendar close to the West Bank. Early supplies
channelled through the main canals may have allowed upstream farmers to benefit from this water and shift calendars.
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which governed this choice is still relevant under changed conditions. When dry-season
cropping developed on a large scale in the mid seventies, the dry-season calendar was
determined based on several constraints, including: the necessity to stop operation for
maintenance purposes; the need to avoid the drainage of irrigated land into lower lands
which are harvested in January; the dry land conditions demanded, in some projects, at the
time of sugar cane harvest (in particular to allow trucks to enter the plots); widespread plot-
to-plot system requiring co-ordination between farmers and calling for a collective, regular
and predictable start of the season; the use of transplanting, also requiring predictability
(nursery). For these reasons, water supplies were scheduled to start around the beginning of
February, with little staggering. A first exception to this rule was the shift of calendars
observed in the West Bank.
Spreading calendars over the November-July period almost doubles the time available to
growa second crop (and allow some farmers to grow three crops over the whole year). This
clearly offsets part of the hydraulic constraint of the network, as implied by its Iimited flow
capacity. A second important point to be emphasised here is the impact of calendar shifting
on crop water use. As c1imatic conditions (precipitations and ET) vary along the year, the
water needs of a given rice crop of, say, 17 weeks, also vary.
ln addition to this, the water requirements for land preparation also vary according to time.
Land preparation, as practised for rice crops established with transplanting or with the wet
broadcasting technique, includes soaking land, ploughing, puddling, levelling and draining
water out before sowing. This agricultural operations, depending on the soil characteristics
and its initial wetness, can take as much as 300 mm of water. In some types of clays which
give way to large cracks when they dry (as observed in some parts of the eastern part of the
delta), this amount can even be of greater magnitude. This is considerable, when one
remembers that the rest of the cycle will request between 850 and 1,100 mm. If land is
already soaked or wet at the time of land preparation, a significant amount of water can
therefore be saved. As for rainfall, a crop grown later in the season will statistically benefit
more from rainfall than if it is grown early in the year. Regarding ET, evapotranspiration will
be at its maximum during March-April, resulting on higher water needs during this period.
We can try to overlay - and aggregate - these different factors in order to see how the
overall water requirements vary with the date of crop establishment. Figure 17 speaks for
itself and shows the dramatic variability of crop water requirement with the date of planting
(percolation rates are taken at 1 mm/day). A short duration rice of 13 weeks consumes
around 1,350 m3 when planted in early February but less than 900 if planted before new
year. A common variety of 17 weeks receiving average effective rainfall, will require more
than 1,500 m3, if planted in early February. Approximately 30% of the total water is saved for
an early planting on the 1st of November, 15% for mid-December. Water savings can be ail
the higher for a very late planting, with a high variation according to rainfall.
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FIGURE 16: VARIATION OF WATER USE FOR ONE CROP OF RICE, ACCORDING TO THE DATE OF PLANTING
1400 , ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................•
1200 I------------=====~===::::::-----------,
1000 +-------_;,..s._-_~------"".......,..-------=:~=----------i
600
-- Rice 17 weeks, no rainfall
- Rice 17 weeks, EfRainfali/2
200 _ Rice 17 weeks, with Efrainfall
5.g Demand management
When considering improvement of efficiency, one generally thinks about avoiding loss in the
canals (Iining) or at the plot level (use of water by farmers). The first point is a question of
civil engineering and will not be touched here. Common wisdom assumes (because the price
paid for water is small or nil) that water waste in irrigation is widespread and that large
amounts could be saved and redistributed. As many observers who propose the introduction
of economic tools keep harping on, "since water is not appropriately priced, it is used
inefficiently, and consumers have no incentive to economise" (Christensen and Boon-Long,
1994)25. This argument runs counters to reality. Let us first turn to the evidence that farmers
are getting the lion's share of Thailan,d's water resources and pitifully squander it. What
cornes to the fore, when one looks at the process of water allocation, is that farmers are not
getting a larger share through sorne kind of privilege or preferential treatment but, rather, that
they are eventually attributed the water which is Jeft (if any). Their "right" is limited to what is
not allocated to other needs and they fully bear the consequence of its unpredictable and
fluctuating nature. It is incorrect to state that farmers are wasting water just because their
share of water is by far the largest. It is so only as far as other sectors have not raised their
demand to more significant levels, and because the government has, in the past, developed
infrastructures to allow a productive use of water in irrigated areas.
25 This seems to be taken as indisputable evidenee. See, for example, declarations of a high-ranking officer
"Water should be prieed in order to increase the efficiency of its use in the farm sector" (The Nation. 2000. April
21); "Agricultural experts agree that water-pricing measures would help improve efficiency in water use among
farmers" rrhe Nation, 1999 Feb. 17); the Director of the National Water Resourees Committee director: "In reality
water is scaree, and the only mechanism to save water and encourage efficient use is to give it a priee" (The
Nation, 2000. April 23); the resident advisor for the ADB in Thailand: "International best practiees suggest that
efficiency in water management can be improved considerably through imposition of nominal water user fees"
(Bangkok Post 2000, June 11). This echoes an endless list of similar outright statements: "if water is cheap, it will
be wasted" (The Economist, 1992); "Currently, most farmers don't have to pay for irrigation water and, thus, have
little ineentive to conserve water or to use it efficiently on high-value crops. As a result, irrigation efficiency is
under 30%" (TDRI, 1990), etc.
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A second assumed evidence which must be put under scrutiny is whether farmers are using
water efficiently. Based on common knowledge that efficiency in large state-run irrigated
schemes is often found as low as 30 or 40%, there is a tendency to stick to this overall vision
without questioning it any furthe~6. The first point which needs to be emphasised is that such
situations are often found in water systems, common in monsoon Asia, which are not closed
(Le which have by and large resources in excess of demand and out of which some usable
water supply is left). The second type of systems are closed systems. There has been
recently wide recognition of the fact that focusing on relatively low water efficiency at the on-
farm or secondary levels could be totally misleading (Keller et aL, 1996). Many systems, and
river deltas typically account for the most significant of them, eventually display extremely
high overall efficiency. More generally, what has often escaped the attention of many
commentators is that such systems have not been passive in front the growing water
scarcity. On the contrary, they have been extremely responsive to it in recent times and have
gradually developed flexible ways to access water in ail places where it can I)e found.
Nowadays, no conventional gravity systems is functioning as it has been designed to.
Individual pumping capacity.has developed in order to tap water in canals, drains, ponds or
aquifer and there are often few unused return f1ows.
The Chao Phraya delta in the dry season provides the most iIIustrative example of such a
closed system. The first point is that most of the return f10w from fields or canals is reused
downstream. Favourable specific locations where double cropping is weil established are
often found along drains, most of which have been gated in order to retain superficial and to
capture sub-superficial f1ows. Pumping in drains is often more reliable than depending on
canal water. If we consider the efficiency of irrigation at the macro level, we must reckon that
the only waste water is the water which eventually f10ws out of the delta system, that is to say
f10ws to the sea. As this f10w is hardly sufficient to control pollution and salinity intrusion in
the rivers mouth (in the dry season), it follows that no or only negligible water is lost. The
second component of water loss is the infiltration. It occurs that such a loss is channelled
either to shallow aquifers or to deep aquifers: in the first case, it is tapped again trough tube
wells or soon returns to the drainage system where it is reused. In the second case it
reaches aquifers which f10w to the Bangkok area where they are notoriously over-exploited,
resulting in land subsidence and horrendous costs in upgrading flood protection and in flood
damages27• We may therefore venture to state that infiltration losses in the delta are not
sufficient to offset the depletion of the aquifers. On the whole, if we except losses by
evaporation in waterways, which cannot be avoided, we may contend, somewhat
provocatively, that the macro-efficiency of the delta is 100% (or more if we consider the
depletion of both shallow aquifers (in some years of limited irrigation supply) and Bangkok's
aquifer).
26 ·Currently, most fanners don't have to pay for irrigation water and, thus, have little incentive to conserve water
or to use it efficiently on high-value crops. As a result, irrigation efficiency is under 30%. Urban consumers and
commercial and industrial users pay only nominal water fees that do not reflect the marginal cost of supply·
(TORI, 1991). If 70% of the water delivered to irrigation areas is assumed to be lost, it should also be shown
where does such an amount of water disappear to !
27 It is estimated that the damages of the 1995 flood amounted to 50 billion baht, that is 2 billion US $ !
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Even when we examine carefully plot irrigation, it is hard to find the decried pattern of
wasteful practices. The main reason is that most farmers access water through pumping.
This is true for ail the farmers located in the lower delta (in this so called fiat conservation
area, water is integrally and individually pumped from a dense network of waterways) and for
an approximate 60 % of the farmers in the upper delta. Altogether, it follows that
approximately 80% of farmers are resorting to pumping, the great majority using low-lift axial
pumps. It follows that because of the costs incurred by these water lifting operations, there is
Iittle likelihood that farmers may be squandering water. Estimates of water use in the delta
given earlier have also shown that efficiency is rather high. Considering ail this evidence, it
appears that harking back to this erroneous picture of the farmer as a wasteful villain is
altogether thoroughly flawed, unfai~8 and at least misleading.
A corollary of this situation is that, in contravention to official declarations, most farmers do
not get water free. It goes without saying that these investments in pumps, motors and
gazoline are not negligible. It has been shown that these pumping costs, because of very
long application times caused by poor land levelling, may even be as high as discouraging
sugar-cane growers to apply the adequate amount of water, despite water being available in
the adjacent ditch (Srijantr and Molle, 1999). It must therefore be acknowledged that farmers
do pay to use water in the dry-season, partly in consequence of the failure to supply them
with gravity water. It follows that the argument that farmers tend to ignore the value of water
is significantly weakened.
A further aspect of the irrelevance of water pricing for achieving water savings in our context
is that, as it has long been recognised (Moore, 1989), there is no way to apply sorne
volumetric pricing in gravity low-Iand rice small irrigation. Therefore, there is no incentive for
farmers to save water, even if they pay for it. Even if we decide to define a pragmatic water
charge for whatever motivation, there are other drastic obstacles to its definition in medium
and large scale gravity schemes. The qua/ity of the access to water in most large scale
schemes of Thailand is so varied that it is very hazardous to define a single fee per area unit
under such circumstances. Big differences exist between head and tail-enders and this
variability cannot be assessed once for ail: the access to water depends upon the overall
amount of water distributed in the different canals, itself a yearly vagary. It will be impossible
to charge someone who was obliged to pump water from a distant drain up to his plot
(sometimes in several successive steps) the same fee than a farmer getting water by gravity
at the head of the canal.
A water fee would then be an additional tax and must therefore be considered within the
wider overall context of national taxation. Asserting that farmers in the Central Plain have
never paid for the irrigation system or for water use may be acceptable literally and in a
narrow sense: if we consider, however, the revenues siphoned off from rice cultivation by the
State through the mechanism of the rice premium between 1952 and 1984, it becomes c1ear
that rice-farmers have indirectly paid back more than it can ever be dreamt of levying through
a water fee. The discussion may also include whether cost recovery concerns state
investments or operational recurrent costs. It is surprising to see that the former has been
28 Charoenmuang (1994) reports that in sorne conflicts in the Mae Taeng Canal Project (Northern Region),
"villagers urged city dwellers and government agencies to economise on water consumption".
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publicly supported by donors. Even in the United States, Postel (1992) reports that 4 millions
ha of the West are supplied "at greatly subsidised prices" by The Federal Bureau of
Reclamation (see also Anderson and Snyder, 1997). Irrigators of the California's huge
Central Valley Project have repaid only 4% of its capital cost.
ln brief, it appears that: 1) there is a significant gap between theoretical economic values of
water and farmers' ability to pay; 2) that it is extremely hazardous to define a fee based on
the area irrlgated in the situations in which the quality of access to water is extremely
heterogeneous; 3) that a fee high enough to offset collection costs would, in the actual
context of fluctuating rice prices, raise the economic risk attached to farming; 4) that no water
saving can be expected from a fiat water fee; 5) that the alleged situation of water waste at
the farm level is a fallacy; 6) that it is incorrect to state that farmers have never paid for
infrastructures or water delivery, as state-recovery was achieved through export taxation; 7)
that an additional tax is to be considered within the wider overall context of national taxation,
where taxes, subsidies and State investments eventually define the reproducibility of
economic activities and shape the patterns of shift from the agricultural sector to non-
agricultural sectors.
5.3.1 Shift towards low-consumption crops
Another possibility to achieve water conservation is to induce a shift away from rice to field-
crops, which consume approximately 40% of the amount of water needed for rice. This,
ideally, would allow more farmers to benefit from a second crop in the dry season. Such a
shift could be boosted by differential taxes, fixed according to the kind of crop.
Evidence of dynamics of diversification in the delta (Kasetsart University and ORSTOM,
1996) show that farmers display great responsiveness to market changes and opportunities
(a point definitely evidenced by the recent spectacular development of inland shrimp farming:
see Szuster and Flaherty, this conference). Good transportation and communications allow
marketing channels to perform rather efficiently. The main weak point remains the risk
attached to the higher volatility of field crops prices, which discourage farmers from shifting
significantly to non-rice crops. As long as the economic environment of field crop production
remains uncertain29, there is Iittle scope to push farmers to adopt such crops or to sustain
criticism on their growing rice, as many have incurred in losses by growing field crops (either
by will or suggestion from extension services). Inducing shifts in cropping patterns to achieve
water saving by means of differential taxes is believed to be unrealistic while such risk
remains.
ln addition, there are several other constraints (agro-ecology: heavy soil with little drainage,
not favourable to growing field crops; labour and capital requirements, skill-Iearning,
development of proper marketing channels, etc.), which condition the process of
diversification and it is doubtful that, in addition to public policies aimed at fostering it, its
29 It can be argued that riee marketing is also uneertain. However, the pofitical sensitivity of riee production is
such thet there are Iimits which cannot be easily trespassed. In contrast, no one really matters if the priee of chili
(a very intensive cash crop with heavy capital investment) swings from 30 to 2 bahtlkg in one year and scattered
growers have little means to voiee their distress and limit their loss.
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pace may be increased beyond what is already observed. Contrary to common rhetoric,
farmers do not need to have their water priced to shift to other productions. They will
increasingly do so if uncertainty on water and priees is lowered. They have time and over
shown dramatic responsiveness to constraints on other production factors, such as labour for
example, and have already sufficiently experienced the scarcity of water to adapt their
cropping patterns, should conditions be favourable30 .
5.3.2 Linking water management, institutional reforms and economic incentives
It has been shown that the rationale to establish water fees for the purpose of water saving
or for cost-recovery is rather weak and based on a poor knowledge of field reality. In
particular, water supply at present is far from resembling a "service", with its requirements of
quality and certainty. The quality of "service" is linked to the whole "water chain", with ail its
technical and institutional aspects at various levels. It has also be shown how the farmers
(and RIO's field staff) strategies have adapted to this context of uncertainty. No collective
action can be undertaken under the prevailing conditions. This takes us to imagine scenarios
in which the potentially powerful linkages between water pricing (by group), institutional
reforms and water management improvement could be activated (Small and Carruthers,
1991). An intermediate solution would be to ensure a water supply at the lateral level
(defined as a sort of "right" to be negotiated), and to have farmers' organisations managing
this supply at lower levels.
What would be expected is that binding farmers together by granting them a collective right
could be a way to "force" them to act collectively in order to (a) achieve greater
efficiency/equity within the command area of their canal; (b) to constitute a bargaining power
to obtain from RIO the water supply they are entitled to; (c) to internally solve the problem of
differentiated qualities of access to water and define individual charges accordingly; (d) to
instil sorne formalised notion of water right which could later be conducive to sorne form of
tradability; (e) to constitute autonomous bodies which could later take over a part of the
managerial tasks attributed to RIO and could further federate at the Project or basin level; (f)
to foster, in return, a corresponding improved performance on RIO's (and EGAT's) part. The
potential benefits are so sweeping that one may be tempted to gloss over the prerequisites to
such moves.
We must first investigate what is meant by "improved performance", what are the constraints
experienced by these agencies, those which mat lie beyond their reach, and those which
offer significant margin for progress. At the other extremity, it must be analysed whether
farmers are able or willing to respond as expected.
It has been shown earlier that there are crucial constraints on the improvement of the quality
of water delivery in the dry season: a more stable hydraulic regime requires the automation
of the main gates at Chai Nat dam, operational procedures to dampen the effect of reduced
dams releases during the week-ends, higher responsiveness to hydrologie events, additional
weirs and structures in the canals to raise water levels, etc. On an institutional level, it still
30 The spectacular endogenous spread of sprinklers in vegetable production observed in the Mae Klong area
shows that farrners are not opposed to investing and adopting water saving devices.
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remains to define how the set of drastic changes needed can be brought into the system with
the acceptation and participation of both farmers and agencies. The costs of establishing
such a policy, defining sound hydraulic units, involving farmers in the conception phase, co-
ordinating uses at the basin level and reducing political interference, controlling and applying
penalties on unauthorised abstraction, settil1g a system in which collected fees are used
locally, in particular to pay RIO's staff, giving farmers a say in how much water is allocated,
where and when, etc. are obviously hUge. These changes must also be phased, as an
eventual success will be conditional on their concomitant establishment.
Ali these measures translate in crucial exigencies addressed to the Thai institutional and
political setting. Management rules, rights and control must be defined at ail the level of the
river basin, which challenges the actual definition of roles. The current institutional deadlock
includes the sheer inadequacy of current laws with the problems experienced; the confuse
definition and scattered attribution of roles and power to the different ministries and strata of
the government; and a context of political interventionism and laxity in law enforcement (see
more details in Molle, 2000).
6 Conclu~ion~ and ptO~P(!ct~
There is little doubt that the short-term evolution of the demand/supply balance of water in
the Chao Phraya basin demands drastic responses both at the technical and institutional
levels. Access to water in the dry season is paramount in defining the sustainability and
reproducibility of agricultural households, but the water available is going to decline 15% in
the next 15 years (for a growth of Bangkok's needs of 5% per year). The analysis of water
allocation in the past 25 years shows: 1) an average cropping intensity of 1.45 in the delta,
with a growth in the past 5 years; 2) spatial patterns of inequity; 3) a growing de-regulation of
cropping patterns and a further weakening of policy criteria for allocating waters; 4) a system
of allocation based on experience but without clear decision making criteria, which increases
the risk entailed by political interference in allocation.
Several aspects of dry-season water management have been emphasised. It has been
shown in particular that the overall efficiency was quite high, and that the management of the
dams was nowadays more neatly attuned to the downstream demand. It was advocated that
the evolution of the energy generation sector (small and declining share of Sirikit and
Bhumipol dam) should be incorporated in the management policy and that dams should now
be formally managed in order to limit or avoid releases lost to the sea (in particular in the
rainy season). It was also shown how the definition of cropping calendars impacted on the
amount of water used and it is recommended to spread these calendars as much as possible
over the October-June period. This means that the schedules must be desaggregated by
main canal, allowing more areas to start dry season cropping just after harvesting the wet
season crop.
While it is common to hear about conflicts for water within the basin, it is of paramount
importance to realise that there is no real competition in terms of allocation among users.
This would happen if their respective water shares were subject to weighed reductions in
case of shortage, and if these weighing coefficients were a matter of debate and negotiation.
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Rather, it appears that the different uses are ranked by priority and that the possibility to
reduce allocation for 1) Bangkok, 2) salinity intrusion, 3) pollution dilution and 4)
transportation is very Iimited. In fact, it is agriculture which bears the brunt of the pressure on
water resources: not only does its share - defined as the remaining available water -
decreases over the years, this decrease also entails that this remaining part is increasingly
subject to interannual variability. These fact are obscured by the dominant common wisdom
that agriculture is indirectly responsible for shortages because of its alleged low efficiency of
use. On the whole, it appears that the elasticity of the different water allocations are in sharp
contrast and that the agricultural sector is eventually the one which must adapt to changes.
It appeared that the objective of achieving water saving through sorne kind of water pricing is
at best illusory, as farmers in the dry-season eventually use only the water which is left, do it
rather efficiently, often indirectly pay for that, and have already experienced water scarcity.
Attributing the responsibility of water shortage to poor efficiency is the most widespread and
misleading misconception. Should irrigation gain 10% in efficiency, this would not diffuse any
crisis but only raise by the same amount the area that will be irrigated (still weil under the
o'lierall potential demand). Shortages and crises are not due to an hypothetical low efficiency
but to the allocation policy and its impact on dams water stocks. This lack of strong technical
criteria in managing dams and in allocating water to irrigation, and the way they are being
challenged by political interventions and farmers' uncontrolled planting31 , are conducive to
drastic shortages and incur in escalating risks. This does not dismiss the fact that efficiency
gains are desirable in that they allow the benefits of water use to be spread to a larger
number of users. But it draws our attention on the inconsistency of the commonly stated
relationship between efficiency and water shortage. Admittedly, "water is far too important to
its users to be the basis for socioeconomic experiments" (Perry et al. 1997). In this regard,
the stance that "markets should be given a chance", only because centralised administration
has shown its limits, appears a bit short.
It was also advocated that economic incentives would fail and/or would be meaningless
unless they are considered as a "binding element" within a much larger reform in which
farmers would participate both in decisions of allocation and in water management at the
secondary and tertiary levels. Such a scenario not only means drastic technical and
institutional reforms, but also that ail of them be phased and backed by a strong political will.
ln other words, what is at stake is the proper management of the transition from a status of
common-pool resource in sparsely populated agricultural areas to one of a collective and
participative management in a more complex world, respectful of basic equity and efficiency
standards.
31 The hopelessness of officiais is apparent in public declarations: The Deputy Agriculture Minister reports in early
1998 that ·plantations in Nakhon Sawan, Tak and Kamphaeng Phet had increased to more than 670,000 rai from
a target of 190,000" (Bangkok Post, 1999, January 13), while the RID director admits that "things are out of
control", with 330,000 rai under cultivation, against a Iimit set at 90,000 rai (The Nation; 1999 Jan 8). "Our major
concern is that we have no effective measures to control the use of water by rice growers. The only thing we can
do is ask for their cooperation to cut down rice cultivation".
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